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Abstract
Basel III introduces new capital charges for CVA. These charges, and
the Basel 2.5 default capital charge can be mitigated by CDS. Therefore,
to price in the capital relief that CDS contracts provide, we introduce
a CDS pricing model with three legs: premium; default protection; and
capital relief. Under simple assumptions we show that 20% to over 50%
of observed CDS spread could be due to priced in capital relief. Given
that this is different for IMM and non-IMM banks will we see differential
pricing?
1 Introduction
Basel III [BCB11] updates capital charges, and introduces new ones such as CVA
(Section VIII para.97-para.99), which can be mitigated with CDS. Observers
have noted that this linkage can create a so-called doom loop where uncol-
lateralized exposures drive counterparties to buy CDS that then push out CDS
spreads, which make unprotected exposure more expensive, etc. [Pol11, Mur12].
This loop, which is driven by capital costs not changes in default probability, is
one reason given for the exemption of sovereign CVA (few post collateral, e.g.
Portugal, Ireland) from one CRD IV draft [Cam12]1. Therefore, to price in the
capital relief that CDS contracts provide in addition to default protection, we in-
troduce a new CDS pricing model with three legs: premium; default protection;
and capital relief. Of course capital relief is only present whilst the reference en-
tity has not defaulted. This also implies that the translation from observed CDS
spreads to market-implied default probabilities must include an adjustment for
capital relief. This adjustment can be calculated using our model.
If markets are complete, with no CDS bond basis, then CDSs can be repli-
cated by taking short positions in risky floating bonds issued by the reference
entity and a riskless bank account [Car05]. If these conditions do not hold, then
it is theoretically possible that the capital relief that CDSs bring will be priced
in. Thus our model provides bounds on the CDS-implied hazard rates when
markets are incomplete.
∗The views expressed are those of the authors only, no other representation
should be attributed.
†Contact: chris.kenyon@lloydsbanking.com
1At time of writing CRD IV is not final
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No knowledge of the CDS buyer’s exposure profile is required by the CDS
seller because the buyer’s choice of CDS notional and tenor provide a lower
bound. However, the portfolio is important when we start from a particular
profile in our examples. We analyse the standardized CVA charge formula
[BCB11], para.104, and show that it is consistent with all counterparties having
mutual correlations of 25%. This then enables us to compare with a hypothetical
IMM case where the mutula correlations are different.
When CDS prices include capital relief, there is no longer a unique CDS price
because different banks have different approved regulatory capital calculations
(the key results are summarized in Table 3). Whilst a bank’s regulatory status is
not public, it is generally known to counterparties. In addition the capital relief
will depend on what is being hedged, in the Current Exposure Methodology
there are different addons for rates, FX, precious metals, and other commodities.
Of course the asset class being hedged may or may not relate to the main
businesss of the CDS reference entity. We show that CDS buyer regulatory
status and the asset class being protected can have significant effect even in
simple examples, especially at shorter (< 5Y) maturities.
Our treatment of the CVA capital charge under Basel III for IMM banks is
limited to the EAD profile (and some commentary on correlation and stressed
parameters). We assume that the 3x factor in VaR (footnote 37 on para.100)
roughly equates to the difference between the VaR horizon and the one year
horizon (para.104) used in the standardised CVA risk capital charge. Will we
see differential pricing post Basel III?
2 CDS under Basel III
In our setup a bank buys a CDS on a reference entity from a CDS counterparty.
We make the following assumptions.
• Capital relief obtained under Basel 2.5 [BCB06] (Part 2: II.D.5) for default
risk, and under Basel III [BCB11] (para.102, para.103) for CVA risk, for
the lifetime of the CDS hedges is priced into CDS spreads, so we have an
additional capital relief leg.
• CDS are traded with perfect collateralization (no minimum transfer amount,
no threshold, instantaneous transfers).
• There is no correlation between the collateralized CDS counterparty de-
fault and the CDS reference entity default.
The assumptions on CDS collateralization and default correlation are also to
avoid the issues pointed out in [BC10] for counterparty risk on CDSs.
A CDS spread (for simplicity we operate with CDS spreads rather than
upfront plus standardized spread levels) is fair when premiums are equal to
default protection plus capital relief:
PremLega,b(rec) = ProtLega,b(rec) + ReliefLega,b(Reg(bank), entity,AC) (1)
The capital relief leg depends on both the default reference entity and the buyer’s
(bank) regulatory status Reg() because different buyers will obtain different
capital relief depending on their regulatory status. Note there is no portfolio
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Maturity IR FX/Gold Equities PM OC
≤1Y 0.0% 1.0% 6% 7% 10%
1Y< and ≤5Y 0.5% 5.0% 8% 7% 12%
>5Y 1.5% 7.5% 10% 8% 15%
Table 1: CEM potential future exposure notional add-on dependency on ma-
turity and asset class under para.92 of [BCB06]. PM = precious metals other
than Gold. OC = other commodities.
dependence w.r.t. the buyer’s deals with the reference entity because that is
implicitly included in the choice of the CDS notional, tenor, etc.
When the bank is not IMM approved it may be calculating EAD using a
method where the EAD depends on the asset class (AC) of the underlying.
For the Current Exposure Methodology (CEM) [BCB06] (section VII, para.91-
para.96) Table 1 shows the dependence on the underlying asset class.
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Figure 1: Commodity notional interpreted as IRS notionals (including CEM
addons) for a range of IRS levels. For current IRS levels (curved black lines are
ATM and ATM+100bps) commodities have relatively low regulatory notionals.
Things are not quite as Table 1 may suggest because different asset classes
have different definitions of the notional of the trade. The notional of an interest
rate swap is the quantity used to create coupon payments (BIPRU 7.2.11).
However, the notional of an other commodity (OC) trade, e.g. WTI Oil, is the
sum of the commodity flows (BIPRU 7.4.16). Hence OC notionals are much
smaller than IR notionals for medium to longish maturities (in IRS terms).
Figure 1 shows the relative advantage of OCs vs interest rate levels for maturities
out 20 years. Of course the regulatory notional of an IRS does not depend on
its tenor (coupon frequency) which is also an approximation.
Equation 1 uses hazard rates on all three legs because capital relief is only
valuable whilst the reference entity has not defaulted. For an IMM bank the
CDS rate is used in both the premium leg and the relief leg because CVA VaR
uses observed CDS spreads (not capital-adjusted CDS spreads). Thus IMM
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banks are, for this item, at a relative disadvantage to non-IM banks whose CVA
formula (Equation 6) does not use observed CDS spreads.
We now expand each leg in Equation 1.
PremLega,b(c) = c E[D(0, ξ)(ξ − Tβ(ξ)−1)I{Ta<ξ<Tb}]
+
b∑
i=a+1
c E[D(0, Ti)τiI{ξ≥Ti}]
= c
∫ Tb
Ta
P (0, t)(t− Tβ(t)−1)Q(ξ ∈ [t, t+ dt])
+ c
b∑
i=a+1
P (0, Ti)τiQ(ξ ≥ Ti) (2)
ProtLega,b(LGD) = E[I{Ta<ξ≤Tb}D(0, ξ)LGD]
= LGD
∫ Tb
Ta
P (0, t)Q(ξ ∈ [t, t+ dt]) (3)
ReliefLega,b(K(.)) =
∫ Tb
Ta
E[Dcap(0, t)H(Krelief(t, cI{IMM}), t)I{ξ≥t}]
=
∫ Tb
Ta
Pcap(0, t)H(Krelief(t, cI{IMM}), t)Q(ξ ≥ t) (4)
Where:
• a, b protection limit times for the CDS;
• β(ξ) number of next coupon payment after time ξ;
• c CDS spread (rate);
• D(0, t) stochastic riskless discount factor from 0 to t;
• Dcap(0, t) stochastic capital discount factor from 0 to t;
• P (0, t) riskless zero coupon bond with maturity t;
• Pcap(0, t) capital zero coupon bond with maturity t;
• Krelief(t, cI{IMM}) capital relief from unit notional of CDS protection at
time t; this depends on the observed CDS spread for IMM banks;
• H(., t) instantaneous cost of capital at t;
• τi year fraction for ith premium payment;
• Q(.) survival probabilities at time 0.
Equations 2 and 3 are standard [BM06] under the assumptions given above,
Equation 4 is new to capture the capital relief obtained from CDS contracts.
Depending on the circumstances it is possible that not all the capital relief is
priced in, this gives a maximum relief value for DCC and CVC.
We have assumed zero transaction costs, e.g. for changing levels of capital.
The equivalence in Equation 4 is when the bank has a given cost of capital, or
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target rate of return on capital which can then be independent of interest rates
and reference entity default time.
The fair CDS spread from Equations 1, 2, 3, 4 is:
c =
LGD
∫ Tb
Ta
P (0, t)Q(ξ ∈ [t, t+ dt]) + ∫ Tb
Ta
Pcap(0, t)H(Krelief(t, cI{IMM}), t)Q(ξ ≥ t)∫ Tb
Ta
P (0, t)(t− Tβ(t)−1)Q(ξ ∈ [t, t+ dt]) +
∑b
i=a+1 P (0, Ti)τiQ(ξ ≥ Ti)
(5)
For CDS buyers with IMM approval Equation 5 has the fair CDS spread appear-
ing on both sides of the equation as it is used (by regulation) in the CVA capital
charge. Thus in that case Equation 5 requires non-linear numerical solution.
3 Capital Pricing
For simplicity we start from the point of view of a non-IMM bank and consider
only credit risk capital, i.e. default capital (leading to a default capital cost,
DCC) and CVA VaR capital (leading to a CVA capital cost CVC). We do not
include market risk or operation risk, etc. Where there are ambiguities in the
Basel documents we use UK regulations (BIPRU) for details. We go into depth
on the derivation of the regulatory equations for the CVA capital charge to
understand the (effectively frozen) portfolio effects in a non-IMM bank, and
how an IMM bank’s (variable) portfolio characteristics can result in different
capital charges.
Basel III specifies the capital required at any given date. However, the cost
of capital for a trade is the lifetime capital cost, not the cost of the trade-date
capital requirement. We consider all capital costs in terms of lifetime cost. Of
course this lifetime depends on the lifetimes of the counterparties. We take the
point of view that the bank (or trader) considers costs as a going concern so uses
counterparty default time as the end of the trade if this occurs prior to maturity.
It would be possible to include own-default time and this is a straightforward
extension.
3.1 CVA Capital Charge
We start from the standardized CVA risk capital charge in [BCB11], para.104,
noting that this is not RWA but capital directly:
KCVC = 2.33
√
h

(∑
i
0.5wi
(
MiEADi −Mhedgei Bi
)
−
∑
ind
windMindBind
)2
+
∑
i
0.75w2i
(
MiEAD
total
i −Mhedgei Bi
)2}1/2
(6)
Where:
• h one year risk horizon in units of years, i.e. h=1;
• wi risk weight of ith counterparty based on external rating (or equivalent);
• EADtotali exposure at default of counterparty i, discounted using 1−e
−0.05Mi
0.05Mi
(as we are using the non-IMM point of view);
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• Bi notional of purchased single name CDS hedges, discounted as above;
• Bind notional of purchased index CDS hedges, discounted as above;
• wind risk weight of index hedge using one of seven weights using the average
index spread;
• Mi effective maturity of transactions with counterparty i, for non-IMM
this is notional weighted average, and is not capped at five years;
• Mhedgei maturity of hedge instrument with notional Bi;
• Mind maturity of index hedge ind.
It is clear that Equation 6 is derived from two sources: firstly a 99% 1-sided
Standard Normal distribution with mean zero, gives the 2.33 factor; secondly
there is an assumption that all counterparties have a correlation of 25%. Taking
Equation 6 with no hedging we have:
K2 ∝
(∑
i
0.5wiMiEADi
)2
+
∑
i
0.75w2iM
2
i EAD
2
i
=
(
1
2
∑
i
σi
)2
+
3
4
∑
i
σ2i
=
1
4
n2σ2 +
3
4
nσ2i
= σ2
(
1
4
n2 +
3
4
n
)
Where we have written σi = wiMiEADi and then made the assumption that
all the σi are equal. Now consider the variance V (n, ρ) of n random variables
with mutual correlation ρ
V (n, ρ) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
cov(i, j)
=
n∑
i=1
σ2i + 2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
ρi,jσiσj
= nσ2 + n(n− 1)ρσ2
= σ2
(
ρn2 + n(1− ρ))
Hence ρ = 1/4, after making similar assumptions on σi for the n random vari-
ables. As n increases the proportionality factor for K quickly converges on
1/2 =
√
1/4 as n2 soon dominates n.
We note that equal mutual positive correlations always lead to a valid corre-
lation matrix whatever the number of counterparties (there are n−1 eigenvalues
1− ρ and one eigenvalue (n− 1)ρ), so ρ = 0.25 is valid.
We can now ask how CVA VaR capital depends on the portfolio distribution.
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3.1.1 Portfolio Effects
Figure 2 shows the how the proportionality factor for K in Equation 6, V (n, ρ),
depends on n and ρ. Of course Equation 6 has a fixed value of ρ built in.
Portfolios with higher ρ will be charged lower capital with the standardized
formula than if their actual CVA correlation was used. Figure 2 shows this
when counterparties are all equal size. Note that the regulatory value, ρ = 0.25
means that each counterparty’s capital effect is close to 1/2 of its stand-alone
effect.
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Figure 2: Equal counterparty contributions. Relative proportionality factor
V (n, ρ) from Equation 6, compared to ρ = 0.25 (regulatory value) for ρ = 0.00
(full line) 0.1 (dashed) 0.25 (thick line) 0.50, 0.75 (dashed) and 1.00 (full line).
Usually counterparties are not of equal size but follow a distribution. We
assume that this portfolio distribution is Log-Normal (limiting distribution when
underlying factors are multiplicative). We keep the average size (volatility or∑
wiMiEADi) constant and alter the dispersion parameter σD of the portfolio
distribution D, thus
D ∼ eµD−σ2D/2+σDN
Where N is a standard Normal distribution, and exp(µD) = 1 (arbitrary choice).
Individual counterparty sizes are taken as quantiles of D. The number of quan-
tiles used is given by the number of counterparties. Since the counterparties are
now not of equal size the exact equivalence with ρ = 0.25 no longer holds.
Figure 3 shows how the proportionality factor in the standardized CVA
capital charge converges as the number of counterparties n increases. With a
range of dispersions of the counterparty sizes, σD = 0.5, 1.0, 1.5 we see that
the proportionality factor converges to around 1/2 for reasonable numbers of
counterparties, i.e. around 1000. The dispersion parameter of σD = 1.5 gives a
long tail of counterparty sizes, and the other cases model more focused portfolios
of counterparty sizes.
Figure 4 considers the standardized CVA proportionality factor for n = 1000
and compares with a set of counterparties with differing (common) correlations.
We see that the standardized calculation is conservative for correlations up to
about 50% and not conservative thereafter. Now in a crisis correlations can
increase substantially. This range of K between benign and high-correlation
scenarios is captured by the fact that IMM banks must use the sum of stressed
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Figure 3: For a range of LogNormal counterparty wiMiEADi distributions (left
panel, dispersion increases as peak moves towards the origin) the proportion-
ality factor in Standardized CVA capital charge converges towards 1/2 as n
increases (right panel). The thick line corresponds to σD = 0.0 and obscures
the line with σD = 0.5, the lowest line has σD = 1.5.
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Figure 4: dispersed counterparty contributions. Relative proportionality factor
of standardized CVA (horizontal line, corresponds to 25% correlation, vertical
line) compared with calculation for correlated counterparties. Standardized
CVA is conservative relative to counterparties with a mutual correlation of up
to 50%.
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and non-stressed capital charges. Thus non-IMM banks may actually have the
advantage. Here we assume for simplicity that the sum of the stressed and
non-stressed parameters effects is the same as the non-IMM K factor as it is a
simple multiplier.
3.2 Default Capital Charge
This is mostly unchanged from Basel 2.5 [BCB06] para.272 and para.38 of Annex
4, we reproduce the equations in the Appendix for convenience, keeping to their
notation. For the Default Capital Charge (DCC) M (effective maturity) is
capped at five years, whereas for CVA Capital Charge M is not capped. For
exposure calculations an IMM bank multiples the EAD of a netting set by a
constant factor α, whereas a non-IMM bank using CEM uses addons based on
notionals.
para.285 specifies that default probability, PD, is the one-year probability
of default (not CDS spread) and floored at 3bps. The derivation of PD is
given in para.461–para.463. Three techniques are permitted (internal default
experience, mapping to external data, and statistical default models) and banks
are required to take appropriate account of long-run experience, explicitly stated
to be at least five years para.463. By implication the major consideration for
PD involves historical data not market CDS contracts (unlike CVA capital in
para.98 of Basel III for IMM-approved banks).
4 CDS Examples
In some examples we now consider the magnitude of the capital relief leg, and
hence the proportion of CDS spread that is paying for capital relief not default
protection. We use the relation that CVA on a trade is equal to the CCDS cost
where the CCDS only considers default. Whilst we acknowledge that in general
CVA on swaps is recursive [BK11] we consider the non-recursive version as an
approximation to focus on capital relief.
To get the dependence on market observed CDS spread into the calcula-
tions that are based on the standardised CVA capital charge formula we scale
the weight w by the ratio of the observed-implied to calculated-implied default
probabilities, at M .
4.1 Interest Rate Swap
As a basic financial instrument we look at vanilla Interest Rate Swaps (IRS).
For simplicity we assume that counterparty default is independent of interest
rates. The key thing we need to calculate is EAD as this feeds into all the
capital calculations, as well as the usual CVA.
Since default is independent of interest rates the expected exposure at any
future time S discounted to the present is given by the corresponding swap-
tion price. We use the inverse riskless discount factor to S to get the forward
premium which is the expected future exposure. Practically we could obtain
forward premia directly from the market, but for examples we use a swaption
implied volatility surface (all data from Bloomberg). Figure 5 shows volatilities
9
holding expiry+maturity constant, that is, corresponding to different underlying
swaps.
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Figure 5: EUR swaption volatilities (6M tenor, OIS discounting) for ATM strikes
of swaps with maturities of 5Y, 10Y, 15Y, 20Y (some lines (10Y, 20Y) are dashed
for clarity). Swaption smile is included in the volatilities.
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Figure 6: ATM EUR swap risk-neutral expected EAD for 100M notional, with
no addons, i.e. without any additions for capital purposes. Exposures have
not been discounted back to time zero, and exclude coupon accruals. Positive
curves are for 5Y, 10Y, 15Y, 20Y swaps receive float. Negative curves are for
receive fixed (plotted as negatives for clarity).
The swaption volatilities in Figure 5 lead to the risk-neutral expected EAD
profiles shown in Figure 6. At this point we remind readers that that risk
factors dynamics behind EAD profiles for DCC must pass historical backtesting
[BCB10]. The underlying risk factors are explicitly permitted to be calibrated to
either market-implied or historical data. For a detailed discussion see Chapter
11 of [KS12].
Figure 7 shows the expected EAD profiles for receiver IRS with and without
CEM addons that are linked to notionals and to remaining maturities. With
current low interest rates the addons are significant fractions of the profiles.
Figure 8 shows the fair CDS spreads for default-only, CEM capital calcula-
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Figure 7: ATM EUR swap risk-neutral expected EAD for 100M notional, with
and without CEM addon. Note that IMM profiles would simply multiply by α
(see text for details).
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Figure 8: Fair CDS spreads for default-only (horizontal line), CEM capital
calculation (jagged line) and IMM capital calculation (increasing line).
Parameter Value Source/Motivation
Alpha α 1.3 middle of range
Hazard rate 0.0156 so 5Y observed CEM CDS is 0.02
Recovery Rate 0.40 typical
Historical Default Probability 0.0024 global BBB from S&P[VKG+12]
Cost of Capital 0.10 choice
Minimum Capital 0.10 typical
Capital Discounting Cost of Capital choice
Table 2: Parameters for IRS Examples. The Hazard rate makes the 5Y observed
CDS rate 2% assuming capital is priced in and this is calculated by CEM. The
2% is chosen to roughly line up with Markit BBB 5Y generic CDS spreads.
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tion, and IMM capital calculation. These CDS spreads are for underlying EUR
ATM IRS as in the previous examples. The jaggedness of the CEM calculation
derives directly from the changes in addon with increasing swap maturity (one
year and below there is no addon). It is also a function of the current low in-
terest rate regime, so the addon appears large. Table 2 provides the parameters
for the example.
4.2 IRS as Other Commodity
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Figure 9: Fair CDS spreads as Figure 8 with an additional line that treats the
IRS as though it was an Other Commodity (e.g. Oil) which affects notional
calculation for CEM and addons.
If we now treat the IRS as though it was an Other Commodity we can get an
idea of the relative significance of the different notional calculation method and
addons. This is shown in Figure 9. The proportion of CDS spread attributable
to capital clearly depends on what asset class is being protected against for
non-IMM banks. Whilst this may appear surprising from a default protection
point of view, seen from a capital angle this is a necessary consequence of Table
1.
4.3 Comparisons
Now we consider reference entities with different hazard rates. The first case is
where the ratings are different (based on S&P and Markit data) and the second
where we hold everything except the hazard rate constant.
Table 3 shows attribution of observed CDS spreads into default protection,
default capital (Basel 2.5) and CVA capital (Basel III), for 5Y IRS. Both non-
IMM and IMM banks are shown. We do not display the numbers for IRS-as-oil
for the non-IMM case because the 5Y maturity is where the asset class is not
important (from Figure 9). We pick the 5Y maturity to display because it is
usualyy the most liquid CDS spread. The part of the CDS spread attributable
to default protection is less than half, and this holds across a range of ratings
(or equivalently observed CDS srpeads). This proportion is lower than in earlier
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Parameters CEM IMM
Rating CDS rec S&P wi default DCC CVC default DCC CVC
bps % bps % % % % % % %
A 90. 38. 8. 0.8 27 42 31 38 36 26
BBB 130. 38. 24. 1. 18 55 27 29 48 23
BB 290. 37. 90. 2. 29 47 25 38 42 20
B 510. 36. 448. 3. 34 45 21 41 41 18
CCC 1170. 33. 2600. 10. 33 36 32 37 35 28
Table 3: Breakdown of observed CDS spreads for 5Y IRS into default protection,
and capital relief: DCC and CVC. Observed CDS spreads are generic from
Markit. 5Y chosen as liquid CDS point. (OC and Rates capital relief are very
close at this maturity (only) so only Rates results shown).
examples because we have there are higher weightings and the S&P long-term
default probability increases quickly as rating decreases.
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Figure 10: CDS spreads from default protection only and including capital relief.
Subject is EUR 5Y ATM receiver swap with parameters as in Table 2.
Figure 10 considers CDS spreads when we change only the hazard rate.
Here we see that the absolute amount of spread attributable to capital relief is
nearly constant as the hazard rate increases. This is unlike Table 3 where the
reference entity changes rating as the hazard rates increase which brings on a
set of associated parameter changes. These parameter changes mean that the
capital relief proporation is increasing in absolute terms.
5 Conclusions
Under Basel III, and previously under Basel 2.5, CDS provide capital relief. If
capital relief is priced in to CDS prices then a new model is required to price
CDSs and derive default probabilities. We have presented a CDS model that
addresses these requirements, now with three legs: premium; protection; and
capital relief. We do not know how much capital relief is actually priced in. This
will be determined by market expectations of when regulations will come into
force, market completeness (replication costs), and competition between CDS
sellers. Unless there is a deep liquid market for shorting the reference entity
bonds (i.e. practical replication) capital relief pricing is possible.
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We have shown that capital relief pricing has a potentially significant effect
on CDS spreads, easily being 20% to 50% of the observed CDS spread. We also
showed that both the IMM status of the CDS buyer and the asset class that the
CDS buyer is obtaining capital relief on have major effects, especially for shorter
maturities (below five years). In addition institutions on the Systematically
Important Banks list [FSB12] will see different prices because they have higher
minimum capital requirements.
The capital fraction in CDS prices is highest for non-IMM banks where
the counterparty has moderate CDS spreads and a BBB rating. However, the
capital fraction will increase for any rating as the hazard rate decreases. Low
hazard rates may correspond to many safe (low default risk) sovereigns and
is consistent with the suggested doom loop for sovereign CDSs [Pol11, Mur12]
being driven by capital.
Unlike our non-IMM bank calculations, our IMM-approved bank calcula-
tions are approximate in many ways and should be taken cautiously. Including
the observed CDS spread into the standardised CVA calculation via default
probability ratio is an approximation. However, this did show that at the 5Y
maturity the effect was at most about a 15% decrease in the default proportion
for the CCC case from 42% to 38%, (data not shown in table). This effect will
increase with maturity.
We have not explicitly made allowance for IMM-banks having to do two
calculations: with stressed and non-stressed parameters [BCB11], para.100. By
implication we have taken the position that the sum of the stressed and non-
stressed K factor effects is equal to the effect of the non-IMM K factor. There
is also the question of VaR horizon and multipliers versus the one year horizon
used in the standardized CVA capital calculation. In general detailed IMM
analysis is an area for future investigation.
For simplicity we assumed that counterparty default is independent of inter-
est rates. Moving to a fully correlated dynamic model is straightforward using
simulation.
Our new CDS model including capital relief can be used to obtain bounds
on hazard rates and adjust observed CDS spreads for capital relief. Given the
potential ambiguity of CDS interpretation between default and capital their
direct regulatory use for CVA may need reassessment.
Appendix: Regulatory Formulae
We reproduce the relevant regulatory equations here for convenience, using the
regulatory notation.
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b(PD) = (0.11852− 0.05478 log(PD))2
R(PD) =
0.12(1− e50PD)
1− e−50 +
0.24(1− (1− e50PD))
1− e−50
KDCC(LGD,PD,M) =
(
LGDΦ
(
1√
1−R(PD)Φ
−1(PD)
+
√
R(PD)
1−R(PD)Φ
−1(0.999)
)
− PD× LGD
)
×
(
1 + (M − 2.5)b(PD)
1− 1.5b(PD)
)
RWADCC = 12.5×KDCC × EAD
M =
∑tk≤1year
k=1 EffectiveEEk ×∆tk dfk +
∑maturity
tk>1year
EEk ×∆tk × dfk∑tk≤1year
k=1 EffectiveEEk ×∆tk dfk
The formula for M above is used when the longest contract in the netting set
has a maturity greater than one year. EE is the expected exposure (exposure is
by definition floored at zero), and Effective EE uses the maximum EE to date
for the first year. For an internal model on a given date:
EADIMM = α× EffectiveEPE
where EPE is expected exposure on a given date. α depends on the bank and
is generally limited to the range 1.2 to 1.4 (higher is possible but not lower
para.33,para.34). Unlike the CEM addon which adds a multiple of notional,
alpha multiplies exposure.
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